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A mia madre.
To my mother.
          
“We must fulfill our freedom of thought
in the freedom of understanding.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Humanism and Terror, 1947. 
“To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the Palm of your Hand,
And Eternity in an Hour.”
William Blake,
Auguries of Innocence, 1863.
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Introduction
The project of the Ethics is to provide guidance for human flourishing. According to
Spinoza the human being is not an 'empire within an empire', but rather it is part of Nature
and develops in and with Nature; for this reason, human beings are to be understood in
terms of natural laws. In order for human beings to live a good life, then, it is fundamental
to gain knowledge of these laws, which are at the foundation of everything that is; this is
the reason why the  Ethics  begins with a metaphysics. In the first part Spinoza famously
identifies Nature with God (Deus sive Natura), or, the one substance, which involves and
explicates everything that is – particular beings and their dynamics. Spinoza then develops
a theory of knowledge, in order to explain how we understand (or misunderstand) the
world through our experience of it. It is crucial to remember that Spinoza is a rationalist
who applies the principle of sufficient reason; in other words, he thinks that there are no
brute facts - and this means that, according to him, human beings have the actual power of
understanding  everything.  However,  Spinoza  is  also  a  practical  philosopher  who
recognizes the finitude of particular beings. Unlike the one substance we are not infinite,
but  we still  have the  power of  making the  most  general  sense  of  things  by constantly
attempting  to  understand  the  world  and  our  place  in  it.  According  to  Spinoza,  such
constant practice is the most fundamental principle of human flourishing, that is, freedom.
In this thesis I am particularly concerned with a specific statement in the  Ethics,
namely E2d6, in which Spinoza states: “By reality and perfection I understand the same.”
The  statement  seems to  be  contradictory  since  it  is  problematic  to  understand how a
notion which apparently accounts for unity (perfection) could possibly be identified with
both the diversity of values and beliefs found in reality and the latter's perpetual flow of
change. The statement is even more puzzling when considering that the terms 'reality',
1
'perfection', and 'power of action' often seem to be used interchangeably throughout the
Ethics,  so much so that  scholars  do not really  differentiate them in a  significant  way.1
Indeed, the theme of becoming is not explicitly addressed by Spinoza and therefore, as a
consequence, it has been taken for granted that his work has no place for it. The main
problem  for  Spinoza  scholars  is  that  he  goes  too  far  in  the  direction  of  identity  and
therefore becomes unable to account for difference. In what follows I argue that this is only
the case if  one reads the identity of reality and perfection superficially.  A more careful
reading suggests that the statement is not a contradiction because Spinoza does elaborate a
theory of becoming, with the notions of perfection and power of action as its core. In the
light  of  this  interpretation,  my  argument  is  that  E2d6  is  not  contradictory  because
Spinoza's notions of perfection and reality are both identified with becoming.
The first chapter offers an overview of the metaphysics of the Ethics and emphasizes
its most important aspects: firstly, I explain the three basic terms of Spinoza's world –
substance, attributes, and modes; secondly, I explain the relation that binds these terms,
namely, how the one substance is expressed in particular beings; thirdly, I elaborate on
two fundamental laws resulting from the terms of Spinoza's world and which determine its
metaphysics,  namely,  causality  and  necessity.  These  steps  are  necessary  in  order  to
understand how particular beings relate and interact on the basis of a common ground, or,
the  one  substance.  The  dynamism  of  Spinoza's  metaphysics,  in  turn,  allows  us  to
understand his establishment of  a unified notion – perfection – which also accounts for
the diversity and uniqueness of particular beings – reality. 
The second chapter is devoted to Spinoza's theory of knowledge and his famous
theory of  conatus,  with an overall focus on the dynamics through which modes interact.
First, I provide an explanation of what is meant in the Ethics by 'adequate' and 'inadequate'
ideas; this distinction, according to Spinoza, supports the difference between activity and
passivity of the mind and the body. This theory of knowledge cannot be understood apart
1 Examples of this are found in Carriero (2011) and Newlands (2017).
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from the notion of conatus – also explained in the Ethics as power of action; thus, I then
explain what  conatus  is by discussing it in terms of relational power. In the concluding
paragraph I take into account the role of experience with regard to particular beings, in
order to argue that Spinoza's conatus and theory of knowledge are two aspects of a unified
theory  of  becoming,  which  can  better  clarify  his  notion  of  the  identity  of  reality  and
perfection. 
In the third and last chapter I further elaborate what I consider as Spinoza's theory
of becoming in two steps: first, I explain becoming  as  learning, since the interactions of
modes represent a constant and situated discovery of a mode through other modes; then, I
elaborate this notion of learning process as what Spinoza considers the highest principle of
human flourishing, namely, freedom.
I conclude that for Spinoza, reality and perfection are one because they are both
identified with becoming. In my opinion, not only does he offer a theory of becoming, but
such theory seems to be the very core of his project in the Ethics. The main advantage of
such interpretation goes beyond the possibility of making sense of Spinoza's identity of
reality and perfection. It also helps us in clarifying his metaphysics, theory of knowledge,
and notion of conatus as different aspects of a unified theory aimed at revealing the traits
of  a  fundamental  tension  between  unity  and  diversity.  Importantly,  it  is  not  part  of
Spinoza's project to solve such tension; on the contrary, it has to be preserved in order to
shed light on the beauty of the One as the Many.
3
Chapter 1
The Metaphysics of Perfection
Introduction
It is no coincidence that Spinoza starts the  Ethics by articulating a sophisticated
metaphysics;  rather,  it  is  a  functional  and  strategic  choice.  He  wants  to  ground  his
practical philosophy - which is aimed at explaining how human beings can flourish in their
lives - on “fixed rules” that can serve as the basis for a “right way of living”, which is the
source  of  “the  highest  self-contentment”.2 Those  'fixed  rules'  are  not  precepts  or
commandments that men and women should apply on the basis of blind trust on a higher
power; rather, according to Spinoza, they are to be derived from a genuine understanding
of the structure of reality. The latter, as he describes it, appears to be complex yet highly
coherent and, as such,  unified on the basis of a common 'ground' that he calls “substance”.
Coherence  of  structure  –the  harmony  in  which  all  the  pieces  fit  together  and  are
reciprocally shaped -  is a fundamental aspect in the Ethics, so much so that it is the subject
of its opening book entitled “On God”. Even though, as Spinoza argues, we often “conceive
the place of man in Nature as being like an empire within an empire”3 we are actually part
of such coherence, and therefore our constitution and activity, including our emotions, are
to be understood within the same structural dynamics of the world we are part of.
In this chapter I briefly introduce the underlying metaphysics of the Ethics in order
to explain how modes (particular beings) interact on the basis of a common 'ground', the
substance (or God). First, I will discuss the triad of substance, attributes, and modes in
order to understand the relation bounding these degrees of reality. I will then consider
Deleuze's interpretation of the unclear yet fundamental notion of 'expression' as explaining
2 E5p10s
3 E3 preface
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how  modes  and  substance  stand  in  a  relation  of  both  ontological  dependence  and
epistemic access. In conclusion I will consider two important concepts which characterize
the dynamics of the Spinozistic world, namely, causality and necessity. These three points
are essential to establish the metaphysical reasons according to which Spinoza states that
by reality and perfection he understands the same.
1.1  Substance, attributes, modes.
Substance
One of the opening definitions of the  Ethics  is that of substance: “By substance I
understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that which does
not need the concept of another thing from which concept it must be formed.”4 Spinoza
bases  his  notion  of  substance  on  a  distinction  that  has  deep  roots  in  the  history  of
philosophy and is derived from Aristotle, who uses the term in two ways. First, substance is
that which depends on nothing else for its existence: in this sense, a  substance is “an
ultimate subject of predication”5,  it is that something that has independent existence or
that, as Aristotle has put it, is 'separable' (distinctly from color, for example: the color of a
red cat cannot exist independently from the cat).6 Second, substance is that which remains
the same despite/through change. This notion is introduced by Aristotle when he states
that 'it seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is
able to receive contraries.' A useful example to understand this idea is given by Parkinson,
who describes “a man who becomes hot at one time and cold at another”7: in this case, the
same 'substance' (a man) is able to 'receive contraries' – it is in fact one and the same. In
this case we can understand how sameness implies both unity and difference (the unity of
4 E1d3.
5 Parkinson 2000, 16.
6 As reported in Ibid.
7 Parkinson 2000, 16.
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man, the difference of temperature).
Spinoza shares with Aristotle the view that substance has an independent existence,
but  while  according  to  Aristotle  there  are  very  many  substances  (things  such  as  an
individual cat or an individual man), Spinoza holds that there can only be one substance,
namely, God or Nature (Deus sive Natura): “Besides God no substance can exist or be
conceived”.8 We will further analyze the issue of existence and conceivability in terms of
ontological dependence in the next section; for now we shall consider other fundamental
characteristics of Spinoza's substance monism. Spinoza states that “It belongs to the nature
of a substance to exist” (E1p7) and that “Every substance is necessarily infinite” (E1p8); the
fundamental characteristics of Spinoza's substance (God) are later summed up in E1p11:
“God – in other words a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses
eternal and infinite essence – necessarily exists.” The necessary existence of God is based
on Spinoza's metaphysical rationalism, according to which everything has a cause or, in
other  words,  there  can  be  no  brute  facts.  In  short,  Spinoza  understands  God  to  be
absolutely  infinite  and  therefore  absolutely  perfect  –  if  God was  to  be  imperfect  then
something outside of it would be conceivable, but since Spinoza's substance contains and
manifest  everything that  exists,  God's  imperfection would be  absurd (“Whatever  exists
exists  in  God,  and  nothing  can  exist  or  be  conceived  without  God.”  E1p15).  It  is  also
absolutely free, since “God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no
one.” (Eip17).9 God is then an independent and infinite substance, which is said to consist
“of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.”10 We will look
at the notion of attributes in the following paragraph; for now I shall briefly consider the
concepts  of  'essence'.  Parkinson  explains  it  as  follows:  “Something,  E,  belongs  to  the
essence of X if it belongs necessarily to X, and if E is such that, in knowing that it belongs
8 E1p14
9 Spinoza defines a thing as 'free' “Which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and it is determined to 
action by itself alone. However, that thing is called necessary or rather compelled, which is determined by another to
exist and to operate in a certain and determinate way.” (E1d7)
10 E1d6
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necessarily  to  X,  we  also  know  something  that  is  of  fundamental  importance  to  an
understanding of X.”11 Even though the term 'essence' is used in various propositions of
part I, it is only in part II that Spinoza defines it:
I say that there belongs to the essence of a thing that which, being given, the
thing  is  necessarily  posited,  and  which,  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is
necessarily  negated;  or  that  without  which a  thing  can neither  exist  nor  be
conceived,  and  conversely  that  which  can  neither  exist  nor  be  conceived
without the thing.12
With regard to the essence of a substance (namely, the essence of God) Spinoza states that
“God's existence and his essence are one and the same” (E1p20). The notion of existence in
the  Ethics is coupled and even equated with that of eternity “in so far as [existence] is
conceived to follow necessarily solely from the definition of an eternal thing.”13 So God's
existence is his essence, which is eternal. But in order to understand how (in what form) a
substance is  manifested,  we shall  look at  the  notion of  attributes,  and later  at  that  of
modes.
Attributes
As  mentioned  earlier,  Spinoza's  substance  consists  of  infinite  attributes;  it  is
therefore of fundamental importance to understand what attributes are. The definition is
11 Parkinson 2000, 320. He continues: “So, for example, it belongs to the essence of a man that he is a mode of God; 
but the fact that he is, for example, a rational animal does not belong to his essence.”
12 E2d2
13 E1d8
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found in E1d4: “By attribute I understand that which intellect perceives of substance, as
constituting its  essence.”  According to  Parkinson, intellect  is  presented throughout the
Ethics as “that which provides us with genuine understanding”; on the basis of this, it is
possible to reformulate the definition of attributes as that which provide us with genuine
understanding of the constitution of substance.14 Commentators are still unsure about why
Spinoza introduces the notion of intellect in his definition of attributes. A viable hypothesis
is that, according to him, the relation between substance and attributes does not designate
a relation between separate entities. In a way, attributes are substance since a substance
consists of infinite attributes, “each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.”15 We
could think of the distinction between substance and attributes as a functional distinction
– a distinction that serves the function of the intellect in understanding the structure of
reality  and,  on  a  higher  level,  the  unity  of  substance.  When  I  say  that  attributes  are
functional I do not mean that they are fictional; rather, because of the fact that they are
both individuated and infinite, they seem to represent the bridge between finitude (in the
sense of individuation) and infinity, and therefore of unity and sameness. It is through this
bridge that the intellect is able to grasp a genuine understanding of substance. In Ip10
Spinoza states that “Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself”; in
order to better explain how different attributes are to be understood independently (which
means that they do not depend on one another for their existence) he appeals to E1d3 and
E1d4;  since  an  attribute  is  perceived  by  the  intellect  as  constituting  the  essence  of  a
substance – and not as, for example, constituting another attribute – it is to be understood
through itself. Considering this, it makes sense to think of each attribute as expressing the
essence of God in a particular and unique way. As Deveaux has noticed “the essence of God
can be conceived in different ways precisely because the essence of God is expressed in
particular  ways  or  kinds.”16 As  mentioned  earlier,  however,  attributes  are  not  to  be
14 Parkinson 2000, 322.
15 E1d6
16 As reported in Crane and Sandler 2005, 193.
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understood as separate entities from the substance they express. In order to better clarify
Spinoza's  view on  distinctions  we  should  consider  Descartes'  articulation  of  the  same
notion  in  his  Principles  of  Philosophy.  Here,  a  “real  distinction”  denotes  a  distinction
between two entities  which are  capable  of  separate  existence-  two substances,  such as
thinking substance and extended substance.17 If, according to Descartes, real distinction is
employed with substances, how can modes be conceived as distinct? Descartes would say:
by means of conceptual distinction (distinctio rationis) which is perceived when two things
cannot  be distinctly  and clearly  understood apart  from one another.  According to  this
differentiation, modes are then perceived as distinct only as result of a real distinction
between substances. Thus, as Crane and Sandler have noted, “A substance and its attribute
cannot  exist  independently  of  the  other,  nor  can  they  be  conceived  separately.  For
example, a thinking substance cannot be clearly and distinctly understood apart from the
attribute of  thought,  nor can this  attribute  be understood apart  from a substance that
thinks.”18 That  is  to  say,  the  distinction  between  substance  and  attribute  is  merely  a
conceptual distinction rather than a real distinction:
For  example,  we  can  have  separate  thoughts  of  extension,  divisibility  and
duration, but none is clearly and distinctly perceived apart from the others –
one  can  –  not  conceive  of  extension  without  divisibility  or  duration  –  and
therefore they cannot exist independently from each other. Only real distinction
is  a  metaphysical  distinction,  that is,  a  numerical  distinction between things
capable of separate existence.19
17 We have already seen how Cartesian dualism does not apply in Spinoza's metaphysics, which is based on substance 
monism. As we will see later in the section, Spinoza sees thought and extension as attributes rather than substances.
18 Crane and Sandler, 196.
19 Ibid.
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 I agree with Crane and Sandler in considering plausible that Spinoza shares the aspect of
Descartes'  view discussed above,  and that  he  considers  conceptual  distinction as  not  a
distinction at all; in fact, Spinoza's denial of the view that conceptual independence implies
metaphysical distinction is clearly discussed in the scholium of E1p1020, which is useful to
report here in length:
From this  it  is  evident  that,  although two attributes  are  conceived as  really
distinct – that is, one without the help of the other – we cannot infer from this
that they constitute two entities,  or, two different substances. For it is of the
nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through , since all the
attributes that it has were always in it at the same time and one could not be
produced  by  another,  but  each  one  expresses  the  reality,  or,  the  being  of
substance. It is therefore far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one
substance. On the contrary, nothing in Nature is more clear than that each entity
must be conceived under some attribute, and that the more reality or being it
has, the more attributes it has which express both necessity (or eternity) and
infinity. Consequently, nothing is clearer than that an absolute infinite being is
necessarily to be defined (as we stated in Def. 6) as an entity which consists of
infinite  attributes,   each  of  which  expresses  a  certain  eternal  and  infinite
essence.
Even though God is a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, and is therefore
expressed in an infinite number of ways, Spinoza maintains that the human mind can in
fact  conceive only two: thought and extension, so that God is conceived as a “thinking
20 “Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself.”
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thing” and an “extended thing”21. Thus, as we will discuss later, modes are conceived as
affections of these  attributes. It is important to remember, however, that the reference to
the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  is  telling  of  a  restriction  of  the  human
comprehension rather than explicative of the metaphysical structure of Spinoza's world.
Again, since the substance is infinite, it is expressed in infinite attributes.22 These, in turn,
are expressed in particular things and beings: modes.
Modes
Generally speaking, by 'modes' Spinoza means particular beings. In E1d6 it is said
that “By mode” he understands “the affections of substance, or, that which is in something
else,  through  which  it  is  also  conceived.”  Individual  beings  are  therefore  affections
(affectio) of the substance, which can be thought of as finite and unique modifications of
the  substance.  Deleuze,  in  his  Spinoza:  Practical  Philosophy,  makes  an  interesting
differentiation between  affectio –  the  modes  themselves  –  and  affectus,  affections  (or
feelings) that “designate that which happens to the mode, the modifications of the mode,
the effects of other modes on it”, so that “The affectio refers to a state of the affected body
and implies the presence of the affecting body, whereas the affectus refers to the passage
from one state to another.”23 Here, by 'affected body' Deleuze means modes, and the modes
21 E2p1: “Thought is an attribute of God, or, God is a thinking thing.”; and IIp2: “Extension is an attribute of God, or, 
God is an extended thing.” In the case of attributes, our understanding mirrors our constitution: since human beings 
are made of thought and extension, those are the attributes we are able to clearly perceive.
22 Newlands gives an instructive insights regarding the maximal (infinite) number of 'expressive attributes': “Given 
God's maximal power (Ip17s) and being (Ip10s), God will possess the maximum number of expressive attributes. 
The fullness of expression is crystallized in Ip14: “God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attributes which 
expresses an essence of substance can be denied.” […] If, by reductio, there were some other attribute a which did 
not express an essence of the one and only substance, what principled reason could there be for its exclusion from 
being among that substance's attributes? As we saw, the best answer Spinoza could provide to such a question would
be to appeal to the fact that the maximal set of attributes excluded a. But according to Spinoza, there are no 
entailment relations, conceptual or otherwise, between the attributes (Ip10). Thus there could be no such ground fro 
the exclusion of a, since no other attribute could bear a relation to a in virtue of which it might exclude a. Therefore,
by Spinoza's version of the PSR [Principle of Sufficient Reason], the lack alone of any excluding relations provides 
a sufficient reason for including a among substance's attributes. Thus substance will possess all possible attributes, 
which is just to say that substance is such that all possible ways of expressing an essence of substance do, in fact, 
genuinely express such an essence. From the PSR and the conceptual barrier between attributes, Spinoza's system 
guarantees the expressive plentitude of attributes.” Newland 2006, 8
23 Deleuze (1970), Glossary p.48-49
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in turn imply the 'affecting body'; the latter, I suggest, should always be considered on two
levels: 1) modes are conceived through something else (the substance or God), therefore
their first 'affecting body' (first cause) is God; 2) modes interact with and are affected by
other modes, therefore their affections (the passage from one state to another) imply the
affecting modes.24
An important statement regarding the doctrines of modes is E1p25c:
Particular things are nothing other than the affections, i.e. the modes, of the
attributes of God, by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and
determinate way.
We should recall now that attributes are “that which intellect perceives of substance, as
constituting its essence.”25 Attributes are then functional as epistemic access for modes to
grasp  the  constitution  of  substance,  and  therefore  of  substance  itself,  as  suggested  in
E1p10s:
Although two attributes are conceived as really distinct – that is, one without
the  help  of  the  other  –  we  cannot  infer  from  this  that  they  constitute  two
entities, or, two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that
each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes that it
has were always in it and at the same time and one could not be produced by
another, but each one expresses the reality, or, the being of substance.26
24 With regard to the relationship of substance and modes, Deleuze further explains: “One of the essential points of 
Spinozism is in its identification of the ontological relationship of substances and modes with the epistemological 
relationship of essences and properties and the physical relationship of cause and effect. The cause and effect 
relationship is inseparable from the immanence through which the cause remains in itself in order to produce. 
Conversely, the relationship between essences and properties is inseparable from a dynamism through which 
properties exist as infinities, are not inferred by the intellect explaining substance without being produced by 
substance explaining itself or expressing itself in the intellect, and, finally, enjoy an essence through which they are 
inferred. The two aspects coincide in that the modes differ from substance in existence and in essence, and yet are 
produced in those same attributes that constitute the essence of substance.” p.91
25 E1d4
26 Emphasis mine.
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With regard to E1p25c, Newlands has rightly stated that “without answering the vexing
question of whether modes for Spinoza are ultimately properties or tropes or  propria or
parts or concepts, etc., we can glean the following functional account of finite modes from
1p25c: a finite mode is that which expresses an attribute in a limited manner.”27 A mode is
indeed a finite and determinate expression of an attribute, and therefore of the substance.
For this reason, if human beings are considered under the attribute of extension they are
body, while if they are considered under the attribute of thought they are minds. Spinoza's
monism allows him to  go  beyond Descartes'  incommensurability  of  substances,  as  the
substance is the ground of a parallelism (of attributes) according to which “The order and
connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things”.28 We  can
reformulate the same proposition as follows: the order and connection of (the attribute of)
thought is  the same as the order and connection of  (the attribute of) extension. Thus,
according to Spinoza the order and connection of ideas mirrors that of things, and this is
possible precisely because both orders are expressions of the same substance. Spinoza's
theory of parallelism is already suggested in the first six definitions of part one – the ones
formulating  Spinoza's  metaphysical  framework;  in  d2  (preceding  the  definition  of
substance, d3) Spinoza states:
That thing is called finite in its own kind which cannot be limited by another of
the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we can always
conceive another which is greater.  In the same way,  a thought is limited by
another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a
body.29
27 Newlands (2006), 9.
28 E2p7
29 Emphasis mine.
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Here we understand that 'finite in its own kind' can be thought of as finite and conceived
through a certain attribute; so even though a mode of extension cannot be limited by a
mode of  thought  and  vice  versa,  a  particular  being's  finitude  is  in  fact  understood  as
conceived under  different  attributes-  manifested  as  finite  in  their  own kind  -  that  are
coherently mirrored and organized on the basis of a common ground (substance).30 This
same  idea  shows  that  the  tension  between  finitude  and  infinity  (or,  also,  unity  and
particularity) is of fundamental centrality in the Ethics and, more importantly, it suggests
how this tension is not a contradictory dichotomy.31 In this sense, modes are the finite
expression of the infinite substance.
It is now for us of crucial importance to ask what 'expression' means in the context of
Spinoza's metaphysics.
1.2  Expressionism
In E1p25c Spinoza states that “Particular things are nothing other than the affections,
i.e.  the modes,  of  the  attributes of  God,  by which the attributes  of  God are  expressed
[exprimuntur] in a certain and determinate way.” From this passage we know that modes
are,  as  already  mentioned,  determinate  expressions  of  God  or  substance.  The  same
expressive character is found in relation to the attributes, “each of which expresses eternal
30 In discussing the substance/modes relationship, Nadler states that “...for Spinoza things are in God or substance in 
the sense of being properties or states or qualities of God. They inhere in God as in a subject or substratum.” To 
relate this conception to Spinoza's parallelism, we can understand that “just as my particular thought at this moment 
is a property or state of my mind, so my mind is a property or state of God (in another of God's infinite attributes, 
Thought). The moving body and my mind just are God's nature (or, more precisely, God's natures) existing or 
expressing itself in one way (mode) or another.” p.55.
31 Parkinson's glossary of Spinoza's Ethics defines modes as “the opposite of substance. To be a mode is to be in 
something else, and to be conceived through that something else.” He agrees in considering finite modes “what 
would normally be called 'particular things'. So, for example, Socrates is not a substance, but a finite mode of both 
thought and extension.” (Parkinson 2000, 322). Even though finite modes are the most common reference in 
Spinoza's metaphysics, it should be noted that there are also infinite modes, what scholars generally call 'immediate 
infinite modes' – motion and rest; “These are described in very abstract and obscure terms in E1p21. Put informally, 
Spinoza's position is that motion and rest are of great importance to the physicist. They are not absolutely basic, 
since to talk of motion and rest is to talk of something extended that moves or is at rest. They are therefore modes of
the attribute of extension; but they are infinite modes, as it is the infinite attribute of extension that either moves or is
at rest. They are also 'immediate', as they require nothing but the attribute of extension in order to exist.” (Parkinson 
2000, 21).
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and infinite essence”.32 Considering this,  expression seems to  be  a fundamental  notion
characterizing the metaphysics of the Ethics.
Deleuze  has  extensively  discussed  this  idea  in  his  Expressionism  in  Philosophy:
Spinoza (1968) and offered useful insights for our current discussion of the matter. In his
work,  he  distinguishes  two  levels  of  expression:  the  first  pertaining  to  attributes,  the
second pertaining to modes. The first level of expression “must be understood as the very
constitution, a genealogy almost, of the essence of substance”33, while the second is “the
very production of particular things”, therefore “expression as production is grounded on a
prior expression”.34 The importance of the notion of  expression lies  in the fact  that its
implications are both ontological and epistemological. While looking at the terminology
related to 'expression' is Spinoza's works, Deleuze writes:
The word “express” has various synonyms. The Dutch text of the Short Treatise
does employ uytdrukken and  uytbeelden (to express), but shows a preference
for  vertoonen (at  once  to  manifest  and  to  demonstrate):  a  thinking  being
expresses  itself in an infinity of ideas corresponding to an infinity of objects;
but  the  idea  of  the  body  directly  manifests  God;  and  attributes  manifest
themselves  in themselves. In the  Correction of the Understanding attributes
manifest  (ostendunt)  God's  essence.  But  such  synonyms are  less  significant
than the correlates that accompany and further specify the idea of expression:
explicare and involvere. Thus definition is said not only to express the nature of
what is defined, but to involve and explicate it. Attributes not only express the
essence of substance : here they explicate it, there they involve it. Modes involve
the concept of God as well as expressing it, so the ideas that correspond to them
involve, in their turn, God's eternal essence.
32 E1d6 and E1p11
33 We should recall that, as Deleuze puts it, “The existence of attributes does not differ from their essence” (Deleuze 
1968, 41) and their essence, in turn, is that of substance, namely, existence.
34 Deleuze 1968, 8.
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To explicate is to evolve, to involve is to implicate. Yet the two terms are
not opposites: they simply mark two aspects of expression. Expression is on the
one  hand  an  explication,  an  unfolding  of  what  expresses  itself,  the  One
manifesting itself in the Many (substance manifesting itself  in its attributes,
and  these  attributes  manifesting  themselves  in  their  modes).  Its  multiple
expression, on the other hand, involves Unity.  The One remains involved in
what  expresses  it,  imprinted  in  what  unfolds  it,  immanent  in  whatever
manifests it: expression is in this respect an involvement.35
This extensive account of expression help us understanding why, according to Spinoza,
“Whatever exists exists in God”.36 The ontological and epistemological value of expression
in his metaphysics is, in fact, the ground of both unity and multiplicity in explication and
implication; expression, we can say, provides an account of both ontological dependence
(of modes in the substance and of substance manifested in its modes) and epistemological
access (for modes to substance through attributes). It is important to remember that in this
relational  metaphysics,  attributes  play  a  functional  role37:  they  are  what  the  intellect
perceives  of  substance,  therefore  they  are substance.  This  is  clearly  stated  in  the
demonstration of E1p15, where Spinoza states that “nothing exists beside substances and
modes (by Ax. 1).”38 The functional aspect of attributes is rightly explained by Deleuze as
follows:
Attributes are like points of view on substance; but in the absolute limit these
points of view are no longer external, and substance contains within itself the
infinity of its points of view upon itself. Its modes are deduced from substance
35 Deleuze 1968, 15-16.
36 E1p15
37 Deleuze highlights this idea by reporting some passages from the Short Treatise where attributes are said to exist 
'formally' and 'in act' (Deleuze 1968, 41-42).
38 According to Axiom 1 “Each thing that exists exists either in itself [substance] or in something else [modes]”.
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as properties are deduced from a thing's definition; but in the absolute limit,
these properties take on an infinite collective being. It is no longer a matter of
finite  understanding  deducing  properties  singly,  reflecting  on  its  object  and
explicating it by relating it to other objects. It is now the object that expresses
itself,  the  thing itself  that  explicate  itself.  All  its  properties  then jointly  'fall
within  an  infinite  understanding'.  So  there  is  no  question  of  deducing
Expression:  rather  it  is  expression  that  embeds  deduction  in  the  Absolute,
renders proof the direct manifestation of absolutely infinite substance.39
Ultimately, we can therefore state that modes are unique and determinate expressions of
the substance, and their existence and interaction is possible precisely on the ground of
such expressionism.
1.3  Causality and Necessity
There are two more aspects that cannot be overlooked when considering Spinoza's
metaphysics, namely, causality and necessity. Importantly, the very first definition of book
one in the Ethics is that of cause of itself (causa sui): “By cause of itself I understand that
whose essence involves existence, or,  that whose nature cannot be conceived except as
existing.” This is better understood in relation to E1p18, where Spinoza states that “God is
the  immanent  but  not  the  transitive  cause  of  all  things.”  As  explained  by  Nadler,  an
immanent cause is generally understood as a cause whose effects are part of or belong to
itself,  while  a  transitive  cause  produces  effects  which  are  “ontologically  distinct  from
itself”.40 A fundamental feature of immanent causation, therefore, is the inseparability of
cause and effect; this means that existence of the effect implies the existence of its cause,
or, as Nadler puts it, “Without the continued existence and  operation of the cause, the
39 Deleuze 1968, 22.
40 Nadler 2008, 61.
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effect would cease to exist.”41 Considering this, in the context of Spinoza's metaphysics, the
cause  of  itself  (as  immanent  cause)  should  not  be  understood  as  some  sort  of
transcendental notion out of space and time; God as cause is rather a dynamic immanent
principle which is implied in all of its infinite effects (that are, in turn, transitive causes) as
existence itself.42 This is why in E1p24c Spinoza states that “God is not only the cause of
things' beginning to exist, but is also the cause of their persevering in existence; or, to use
Scholastic terminology, God is the cause of the being (causa essendi) of things.”43 Since
transitive causation as such, on the other hand, does not imply activity or existence (of
both itself and its effects), we can make sense of E1p28:
Every  particular  thing,  or,  any  thing  which  is  finite  and  has  a  determinate
existence, cannot exists or be determined to operate unless it is determined to
existence  and  operation  by  another  cause,  which  is  also  finite  and  has  a
determinate  existence;  and  again,  the  latter  cause  also  cannot  exist  and  be
determined to operation unless it is determined to existence and operation by
another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on to
infinity.
Thus, the activity of whatever is finite has to be grounded on an immanent cause implying
(infinite) existence.44
Considering the notion of God as  causa sui, it is not surprising that Spinoza, in his
explanation, also makes use of the notion of necessity; God necessarily exist – it is actually
existence itself  (E1p11), and “There must follow, from the necessity of the divine nature,
41 Nadler 2008, 62, emphasis mine.
42 This is why,according to Spinoza, God cause can also be thought of as God as reason (causa seu ratio – E1p11, first 
Alternative Proof).
43 E1p24: the essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.”
44 With regard to E1p28, Parkinson has rightly noticed that “Spinoza does not regard such a chain of causes as 
terminating in a God who is outside the chain; rather, all this causal activity takes place in God.” (Parkinson 2000, 
29).
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infinite  things  in  infinite  ways.”45 In  other words,  reality  follows from the necessity  of
existence,  which  is  the  essence  of  God  (by  E1p20).  This  notion  of  necessity  explains
Spinoza's  idea  of  God  as  Nature  (Deus  sive  Natura,  where  sive  –  'or'  -  designates
identification),  which  rectifies  the  illusion  of  final  causes  (according  to  which  “men
commonly suppose that all  natural things act on account of an end as they themselves
do”46) and the theological illusion (according to which “gods arrange everything for the use
of men, in order that they might bind men to them and be held by them in the highest
honour”47). God necessarily exists and does not act on account of an end, therefore to pray
to Spinoza's God would be as useless as praying to gravity:
I do not need many words in order to show now that Nature has no end which is
pre-established  for  it,  and  that  all  final  causes  are  nothing  but  human
inventions. […] All natural things proceed with a certain eternal necessity and
with supreme perfection.48
Conclusion
Spinoza's metaphysics is  a metaphysics of perfection. As discussed above, the fact
that  everything  that  is  is  a  unique and determinate  expression of  the  one eternal  and
infinite substance, makes it easier to understand why he identifies reality as perfection.
The latter, then, is not an external paradigm to which beings should aspire – since beings
are perfect, as they involve and explicate the substance. Importantly, the uniqueness of
modes and the unity of substance maintain a tension between the One and the Many (and
45 E1p16.
46 E1Appendix
47 Ibid
48 Ibid
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between  finitude  and  infinity)  which  has  puzzled  many  philosophers  and  scholars.49
However,  I  think Spinoza's  intention in building his metaphysics  was not to solve this
tension: on the contrary, he tried to uncover and highlight it as the grounding principle of
reality  and  Nature,  which  in  turn  (by  Spinoza's  naturalism)  is  grounding  principle  of
human existence.
 
49 First and foremost Hegel. More contemporary examples include Carriero (2011, 2017), Lin (2006), and Parkinson 
(2000).
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Chapter 2
Persevering in Perfection:
A Theory of Becoming
Introduction
In the first chapter we have seen how, according to the metaphysics elaborated in
the  Ethics, modes (particular beings) are finite modifications and expressions of the one
substance. In this chapter, I will argue that Spinoza's theory of knowledge, together with
his theory of conatus, can be understood as a unified theory of becoming. The advantage of
this reading is that it make sense of the identity of reality and perfection by taking into
account change and – more generally – the dynamics of everything that is. In other words,
the  notion  of  becoming  is  fundamental  in  understanding  how  things  “proceed  with
supreme perfection”.50
As  previously  mentioned,  the  project  of  Spinoza's  work  is  aimed  at  providing
guidance  for  human  flourishing,  hence  a  great  part  of  the  Ethics is  devoted  to
understanding  and  explaining  how  modes  –  and   in  particular  human  beings  –  are
structured and how they relate to and in the world, or, to use Spinoza's terminology, how
they persevere in their being. In order to do so he develops a theory of knowledge based on
'adequate'  and 'inadequate' ideas. Adequate and inadequate cognition is what leads the
mind, and consequently the body, to be active or passive. In the first section of this chapter
we will look at Spinoza's theory of adequate and inadequate ideas. The latter, however,
cannot be understood apart from Spinoza's famous theory of conatus, according to which
“Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its being.” 51 The second
50 E1 Appendix.
51 E3p6.
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section will briefly explain this theory in order to discuss conatus as power of action and, in
particular, as relational power. Finally, the third section will take into account the role that
experience plays in both Spinoza's theory of knowledge and theory of conatus, in order to
ultimately argue that these represent two aspects of a unified theory of becoming.
2.1  Spinoza's Theory of Adequate and Inadequate Knowledge
The way in which we form ideas plays a fundamental role in Spinoza's system, and
the second book of the Ethics entitled 'On the Nature and Origin of the Mind' is devoted
precisely  to  this  topic.  Before  discussing  what  Spinoza  means  by  'adequate'  and
'inadequate' ideas it is fundamental to understand how and why we should not consider
this differentiation as equal to that of 'true' and 'false'. In E2p32 it is said that “All ideas, in
so far as they are related to God, are true.” In the demonstration of the same proposition
Spinoza explains that this is the case because “All ideas which are in God agree entirely
with  those  things  of  which  they  are  the  ideas,  and  so  they  are  all  true.”  From  these
statements we might wonder, then, what is conceived as 'false', and the short answer would
be: nothing. In the following proposition it is said: “There is nothing positive in ideas on
account of which they are called false.”52 Its demonstration is also important:
If you deny this, then conceive (if this can be done) a positive mode of thinking
which constitutes the form of error, i.e. of falsity. This mode of thinking cannot
be  in  God  (by  the  preceding  Proposition);  but  it  can  neither  exist  nor  be
conceived outside God (by Prop 15, Part I).53 So nothing positive can exist in
ideas, on account of which they are called false. QED.
52 E2p32.
53 “Whatever exists exists in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.” (E1p15.)
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It is unclear what Spinoza means here by 'positive', but it is plausible to understand this as
'existing'.  In  other  words,  according  to  him  nothing  that  exists  in  God  can  be  false;
however,  since  nothing  can  exist  or  be  conceived  outside  God,  then  everything  exists.
Having established this, Spinoza then provides a definition of falsity, which consists in the
privation of knowledge which inadequate, i.e. mutilated and confused ideas, involve.”54 He
seems to use two different registers, one involving adequate and inadequate ideas, and one
involving true ideas – but not strictly false ones; this is why adequate ideas are true ideas,
but we cannot really understand inadequate ideas as false, since they actually consist in
privation of knowledge. The latter consists in confused ideas (in which causes and effects
are  misinterpreted  as  reversed)  and mutilated ones  (in  which  the  cause  of  the  idea is
missing). It seems that inadequate ideas are about misinterpretation of causal relations,
and the problem with misinterpretations is that they are as real as everything else, and
therefore we act upon them. In the Demonstration of E2p35 Spinoza states:
Falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to
err and to be deceived); nor again can it consist in absolute ignorance, for to be
ignorant and to err are different. So it consists in the privation of knowledge
which the inadequate knowledge of things, or, inadequate and confused ideas,
involve.55
54 E2p35.
55 In the following Scholium Spinoza provides some useful examples: “Men are deceived that they think themselves 
free, an opinion which consists simply in the fact that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes 
by which those actions are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty: that they know no cause of their 
actions. For when they assert that human actions depend on the will, these are just words, of which they have no 
idea. They are all ignorant of what the will is and how it moves the body, and those who boast otherwise and invent 
dwelling places and habitations for the soul tend to evoke laughter or disgust. So also, when we see the sun, we 
imagine it to be about two hundred feet distant from us; an error which consists, not in this imagination alone, but in 
the fact that whilst we imagine the sun in this way we are ignorant of its true distance and of the cause of this 
imagination. For even after we get to know that the sun is distant from us by over six hundred diameters of the earth 
we shall still imagine it to be close at hand. For we imagine the sun to be close, not because weare ignorant of its 
true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far as the body is affected by
the sun.”
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To summarize, everything in Nature is true, but the way we relate to it (meaning the way
we understand it and behave in it, at the same time) can be adequate or inadequate. At the
beginning of the second part, Spinoza introduces his discussion by saying:
I pass now to an explanation of those things that necessarily had to follow from
the essence of God, or, an external and infinite entity. Not, however, all of them;
for we demonstrated in Prop. 16 Part I, that from that essence there must follow
infinite things in infinite ways. I shall explain only those things that can lead us,
as it were by the hand, to a knowledge of the human mind and of its supreme
blessedness.
Spinoza is being very practical here: he cannot explain all  those things that necessarily
follow from God, since they are infinite and he – as finite – does not know all of them.56 He
therefore explains that he will discuss in particular those things by means of which we can
understand how the mind works and, at the same time, how such understanding can lead
us to live a good life in terms of praxis.
It  should be  noted that even if  the second part  of  the  Ethics  is  entitled 'On the
Nature and Origin of the Mind' (and therefore seems to promise a discussion on the Mind
alone57) the first of its Definitions is that of Body.58 This is because, according to Spinoza,
mind and body proceed in parallel: they are determinate expressions of the attribute of
thought and the attribute of extension, and even though – as we have seen in chapter one –
they are necessarily conceived separately, they nevertheless express the one substance, and
therefore operate on a common ground.59 This is why in E3p12 and E3p13 Spinoza states
56 It should be remembered that, as noted in chapter one, not only are particular modes infinite – are are also expressed
in infinite attributes, of which we perceive only two: thought and extension. This is already a hint to understand that 
knowledge, according to Spinoza, cannot possibly make something finite into something infinite. In other words, we
cannot know everything from the standpoint of infinity, not even by means of cognition.
57 Nothing in Spinoza, apart from God, exists 'in itself'.
58 E2d1: “By body I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate way the essence of God, in so far
as he is considered as an extended thing.”
59 This is emphasized in E2p13: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or, a certain actually 
existing mode of extension, and nothing else.”
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that “The mind endeavours, as far as it can, to imagine those things which increase or help
the body's power of acting”, and that “When the mind imagines things that diminish or
hinder the body's power of acting, it endeavours, as far as it can, to recollect that which
excludes the existence of these things.” We will discuss in the next section what Spinoza
means by 'power of acting'; for the purpose of our current discussion it is important to
keep in mind that the way in which we form adequate and inadequate ideas affects both
the mind and the body.
Let us go back to the differentiation of adequate and inadequate ideas. For purpose
of clarity, it is important to know that according to Spinoza ideas are not abstract entities,
but rather actions, in the specific sense of acts of judgment. In Parkinson's words, they are
judgments in the sense of “thinking of something as being of a certain nature.”60 In E3d3,
Spinoza states:
By an idea I understand a conception [conceptus] of the mind, which the mind
forms on account of the fact that it is a thinking thing.
Explanation.  I  say  'conception'  rather  than  'perception'  because  the  word
'perception' seems to indicate that the mind is in a passive relation to an object;
but 'conception' seems to express an action of the mind.61
The fact that ideas are actions also clarifies why, according to Spinoza, there are no false
ideas (it would be odd, in fact, to talk about 'false actions'). In E2d4 Spinoza states that by
an adequate idea he understands “An idea which, in so far as  it  is  considered in itself
without relation to its object, has all the properties, or, the intrinsic denominations, of a
60 Parkinson 200: 321.
61 According to Parkinson “It later becomes clear (E2p49 and s) that the action in question is that of affirmation or 
denial. To have an idea of X is to think of X, in the sense of affirming or denying something of it.” (Parkinson 2000: 
330.) In E2p49 Spinoza states that: “There is in the mind no volition, or, no affirmation and negation, apart from that
which an idea involves in so far as it is an idea.” We can therefore understand why, in the corollary of the same 
proposition, he states that “Will an intellect are one and the same.”
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true idea.” So adequate ideas are true ideas: they are clear, distinct, and related to God, but
they do not require a 'true' relation to their object in order to be adequate. It seems that
Spinoza is establishing here a guarantee of epistemic access which is not solely dependent
on a strict subject-object correspondence in terms of representation. I think this is because
a strict separation of subject-object in terms of representation would undermine Spinoza's
concern with  the active  part  of  the  subject  in  understanding the world  and making it
meaningful  –  and,  in  turn,  making  it  coherent  too  (as  a  world  that  make  sense).
Considering this,  the  way  in  which  a  subject  makes  the  world  meaningful  in  terms of
adequate and inadequate ideas has to take into account her predispositions or, in Spinoza's
terms, her essence. This will be discussed further in the next section. For now let us look at
adequate ideas considered in themselves, or 'without relation to their objects'. In E2p37,
Spinoza says: “That which is common to all things and which is equally in the part and in
the whole constitutes the essence of no particular thing”, and in the following proposition
he continues: “Those things which are common to all things, and are equally in the part
and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.”62 According to the first proposition
there is something which is “common to all things” and yet cannot be identified with any
particular essence;63 at the same time, though, since it is found equally in the part and in
the whole,  this  something has an important relational  aspect to it.  In addition to this,
Spinoza  says  that  the  latter  can  only  be  conceived  adequately:  in  other  words,  these
“common  notions”  -  as  he  calls  them  in  E2p40s2  –  are  necessarily  true,  and  cannot
possibly  be  inadequate.  Importantly,  because  of  the  parallelism  of  mind  and  body,
common notions are both a relation (in the sense of  agreement) of ideas and a relation of
bodies. Deleuze importantly emphasizes that common notions “are not at all abstract ideas
but general ideas”64, and he explains them as follows:
62 E2p38.
63 By 'essence' of a thing Spinoza understands “that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited, and which, 
being taken away, the thing is necessarily negated; or that without which a thing can neither exist nor be conceived 
without the thing.” (E2d2.)
64 Deleuze 1988: 54.
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The common notions are generalities in the sense that they are only concerned
with the existing modes without constituting any part  of the latter's singular
essence.  But  they  are  not  at  all  fictitious  or  abstract;  they  represent  the
composition of real relations between existing modes or individuals. Whereas
geometry only captured relations in abstracto, the common notions enable us to
apprehend them as they are, that is, as they are necessarily embodied in living
beings,  with  the  variable  and  concrete  terms  between  which  they  are
established.  In  this  sense,  the  common  notions  are  more  biological  than
mathematical,  forming a natural  geometry that allows us to comprehend the
unity of composition of all of Nature and the modes of variation of that unity.65
The relation of part and whole represented by common notions is also called by Spinoza as
“knowledge of the second kind”66, which is identified with Reason.67
To  summarize,  according  to  Spinoza  ideas  are  act  of  judgments  which  can  be
adequate or inadequate. This differentiation does not depend on a one-sided subject-object
representation, but is rather the product of a subject-object relation. The latter is crucial,
since for Spinoza, understanding is the means through which we establish our relation to
the world, our place in the world, and our world as a whole. It is, then, the way in which we
relate to reality as perfection. In the next section I shall discuss the fundamental terms of
such relation, with particular reference to Spinoza's theory of  conatus.  I suggest that the
way in which things persevere in their being – or the way in which “everything proceed
65 Deleuze 1988: 57.
66 E2p40s2.
67 According to Spinoza there are three kinds of knowledge: imagination, reason, and intuitive knowledge. Among 
these, as stated in E2p41 and E2p42, imagination is the only kind of knowledge through which we form inadequate 
ideas, while both reason and intuitive knowledge guarantee access to adequate ideas (as they are clear and distinct, 
and they grasp the part-whole relation). The difference between second and third type of knowledge, according to 
Spinoza, is that through reason we grasp the part-whole relation moving from the part to the whole, while through 
intuitive knowledge we move from an understanding of the whole to an understanding of the parts.
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with absolute perfection”68 - considered in the context of the metaphysics and theory of
knowledge articulated in the Ethics, should be considered comprehensively as a theory of
becoming, with conatus as its core.
2.2  Conatus as Relational Power
The  active  part  of  the  subject  in  making  the  world  meaningful  depends  on  its
essence. The first definition of 'essence' is provided at the beginning of Part Two:
I say that there belongs to the essence of a thing that which, being given, the
thing  is  necessarily  posited,  and  which,  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is
necessarily  negated;  or  that  without  which  a  thing  can  neither  exist  nor  be
conceived, and conversely that which can neither exist nor be conceived without
the thing.69
Later on, in Part Three ('On the Origin and Nature of Emotions') he further elaborates this
ideas in terms of  conatus  in two Propositions: a) “Each thing, in so far as it is in itself
[quantum  in  se  est], endeavours  [conatur]70 to  persevere  in  its  being  [in  suo  esse
perseverare].”71; b) “The endeavour by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its
being is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing.”72 The essence of a thing, then,
is what posit the thing as such; it is a certain uniqueness without which a thing would not
exist. Such uniqueness not only is what posits a thing as what it is, but also shapes the
terms of relation of that thing to the world – in this sense, it can be considered a source of
68 E1 Appendix.
69 E2d2.
70 From the Latin verb cōner, 'to try' or 'to attempt'.
71 E3p6.
72 E3p7.
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meaning-making. Carriero has argued that “A natural thought, common to both Spinoza
and the Aristotelian tradition, is that there is an intimate connection between what you are
– your essence – and what it is for you to flourish.”73 I believe he is right, and that this
'intimate connection' is fundamental to the project of the Ethics. In the case of Spinoza's
theory of conatus, however, each thing's endeavour to persevere in its being is very much
dependent on its relation to other essences. This is already evident from what we have
discussed so far:  nothing can be conceived as existing 'in itself'  (since every particular
being is a determinate modification of God and part of causal relations), and everything
cannot but be considered in its existence, in medias res. I think this is very important with
regard to Spinoza's idea of conatus: it depends on the fundamental intuition that, as long
as  we  exist,  we  cannot  really  stop  doing  so.  We  always  find  ourselves  in  the  world,
establishing relations with other beings which, in one way or another, affect us and hence
constantly inform and reshape our being in the world.
In a sense, the very perception and conception of ourselves is already relational: in
E2p11 Spinoza says that “The first thing that constitutes the actual being of the human
mind is simply the idea of some particular thing that actually exists”, namely, the body. 74
With regard to particular things, we should also be reminded that:
The idea of a particular thing that actually exists has God for a cause, not in so
far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea
of a particular thing that actually exists, of which God is also the cause in so far
as he is considered as affected by another, third idea, and so on to infinity.75
Particular beings necessarily follow from God; at the same time, Spinoza also states that
“The being of substance does not belong to the essence of man; or, substance does not
73 Carriero 2017: 142.
74 “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or, a certain actually existing mode of extension, 
and nothing else.” (E2p13.)
75 E2p9.
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constitute the form of man”76 - and this is why he then affirms that “The essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.”77 It  would be possible to
consider these 'certain modifications' which make up the essence of man (later defined as
conatus) as man's mind and body; according to my interpretation,  however, mind and
body as modifications constituting man's essence need to be considered together with their
own affections or, in other words, the relations with other beings in which man enters and
the effects these relations have on him. Several passages of Part Two seem to support this
interpretation: when discussing his theory of bodies, Spinoza explains that “A body which
is in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another body,
which was also determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so
on to  infinity.”78 Importantly,  when  discussing  how a  mode  perceives  other  modes  as
affecting it, Spinoza says: “The idea of any mode, by which the human body is affected by
external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body and  at the same time the
nature of the external body.”79 In the first Corollary of the same proposition he also adds
that “From this it follows that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies
together  with the nature of its own body.”80 So our knowledge and perception is always
compositional. The ways in which a mode relates to or is affected by other modes is central
to the discussion of  conatus  in Part Three. This theory is a core concept in the overall
project of the Ethics, since it summarizes and formalizes several tensions which have been
established in Part One and Two. In particular, the notion of conatus embodies the tension
between the One and the Many on two levels: 1) the tension between substance and modes;
2) the tension between a mode and other modes.
Let us go back to Spinoza's discussion of conatus. In the Demonstration of E3p7, he
76 E2p10. The relation between 'essence' and 'form' is mentioned again in the last paragraph of the Preface to Part Four,
where the two notions seem to be equivalent: “For it must be specially noted that when I say that someone passes 
from a lesser to a greater perfection, and conversely, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, i.e. 
one form, into another.”
77 E2p10c.
78 E2l3.
79 E2p16 (emphasis mine).
80 E2p16c1 (emphasis mine).
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connects this endeavour with power:
From the given essence of each thing, certain things necessarily follow (by Prop.
36, Part I), nor can things do anything other than that which necessarily follows
from  their  determinate  nature  (by  Prop.  29,  Part  I).  So  the  power,  i.e.  the
endeavour, of each thing by which, either alone or with others, it either acts or
endeavours to act – that is (by Prop. 6, Part 3) the power, i.e. the endeavour, by
which it strives to persevere in its being – is nothing other than the given, i.e. the
actual, essence of the thing. QED.81
So the essence of a thing, its conatus, consists in its power – in the sense of a determinate
tendency to persevere in its being. Now, a being's power can be augmented and diminished
depending on both the ways in which it is affected by other beings and the ways in which it
affects them in return; in other words, a being's power is relational. When Spinoza says
that something perseveres 'in its being' according to its 'determinate nature', I think he is
referring to both the fact that modes are finite (and therefore have limited power in limited
terms) and that – as determinate modifications of substance – they are unique, or, the
terms of their power are unique.
We  have  previously  mentioned  that  ideas  are  acts  of  judgments,  or  acts  of
understanding,  which  posit  the  relation  of  a  mode  to  other  modes.  In  E3p1,  Spinoza
further elaborates his theory of knowledge by saying that “Our mind sometimes acts, but
sometimes is passive; namely in so far as it has adequate ideas, so far it necessarily acts,
and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, so far it is necessarily passive.” In the previous
section I have discussed what Spinoza means by adequate and inadequate ideas; in Part
Three,  he further  elaborates  this  distinction by relating it  to  the  emotions  (affectus).82
81 E3p7d.
82 Deleuze provides a clear explanation of the difference between affectus and affectio: “It has been remarked that as a 
general rule that affection (affectio) is said directly of the body, while the affect (affectus) refers to the mind. But the 
real difference does not reside there. It is between the body's affection and idea, which involves the nature of the 
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Considering Spinoza's aim of establishing practical guidelines for human flourishing, he
could not avoid to discuss the role of the emotions at length. He introduces the topic by
providing the following definition:
By emotion I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of
acting is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the same time the
ideas of these affections. If, therefore, we can be adequate cause83 of one of these
affections, then I understand by the emotion an action; otherwise, I understand
it to be a passion.84
Emotions are a fundamental indicator of transition from one state to another and, again,
they simultaneously relate to both mind and body (“Whatever increases or diminishes,
helps or hinders,  our body's  power of  acting,  the idea of  that  same thing increases  or
diminishes, helps or hinders, our mind's power of acting.”85). In the Scholium of E3p11,
Spinoza links changes in power to changes in perfection by saying that “The mind can
undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater and now to a lesser perfection.” We have
seen that, in E2d6, Spinoza says that by reality and perfection he understands the same;
this identity of reality and perfection is discussed again later in the Preface to Part Four ,
with regard to the model of human nature:
Then  we  shall  say  that  men  are  more  or  less  perfect  as  they  approach  this
exemplar more or less.  For it  must be especially  noted that when I say that
someone passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and conversely, I do not
external body, and the affect, which involves an increase or decrease of the power of acting, for the body and the 
mind alike. The affectio refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, whereas
the affectus refers to the passage from one state to another.” (Deleuze 1988: 49.)
83 “I call an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself. I call that an inadequate,
or, a partial, cause whose effect cannot be understood through itself.” (E3d1.)
84 E3d3.
85 E3p11.
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understand that he is changed from one essence, i.e. one form, into another.
(For a h0rse, for example, is as much destroyed if it is changed into a man as if it
is changed into an insect.) Rather, we conceive someone's power of acting to be
increased or diminished in so far as this is understood through his own nature.
Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, understand reality; that
is, the essence of each thing in so far as it exists and operates in a certain way,
no attention being paid to its duration.
Spinoza  here  attacks  what  he  considers  a  very  misleading  notion  of  perfection  as
something external to the structure of Nature and particular beings, something other than
what  already  is.  According  to  him,  this  conception  results  from prejudice  rather  than
“genuine  knowledge”.86 Contrary  to  this,  he  considers  reality  as perfection  not  only
because every particular being necessarily follows from the one substance, but also because
we are finite and determinate beings, and negating this principle would be the same as
negating reality as a whole. In other words, aspiring to artificial models which are alien to
Nature -and to human nature - is not only nonsense: it is actually a betrayal of our own
essence.
I previously mentioned that the emotions are an important indicator of transitions
from one state to another; we can now understand that the transition specifically refers to
the passage from a greater to a lesser perfection, or from a lesser to a greater perfection,
and since perfection and reality are one and the same, the transition refers to degrees of
reality. The more perfect a being is, the more real it is. So according to Spinoza, pleasure is
“man's transition from a lesser to a greater perfection”87, while pain is “man's transition
from  a  greater  to  a  lesser  perfection.”88 Importantly,  states  of  perfection  cannot  be
considered in themselves, but rather in the context of existence and its duration. This is
86 E4Preface.
87 E3DOE2.
88 E3DOE3.
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mainly for two reasons: first, a transition from one state of perfection to another implies a
previous  state  of  perfection  to  which  the  transition  is  compared  (and  from  which  it
derives); second, nothing that is can be considered independently from causal relations. So
perfection is always a matter of change in context and it is always relational. In this sense
the notion of perfection is related to that of becoming.
For purpose of clarity we could now wonder: perfection is reality, but is this also the
same as  power? It  is  undeniable  that  Spinoza often seems to  use these three  terms –
perfection, power, and reality - as synonyms, and in fact the short answer to this question,
I  think,  would  be  yes.  Scholars  such  as  Carriero,  for  example,  usually  do  not  make
important significant differentiations between these terms: “In many contexts, power of
acting and perfection are interchangeable, as are perfection and reality. So I am not going
to be very fussy about what differences there might be between power of acting, perfection,
and reality.”89 This position would be supported by the Demonstration of E4p4, which
states that “The power by which particular things, and consequently a man, preserve their
being is the power of God, i.e. of Nature (by Prop. 24, Coroll, Part I); not in so far as it is
infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by actual human essence (by Prop. 7, Part 3).”
On  the  other  hand,  a  closer  reading  of  this  passage  would  impose  an  important
differentiation between reality as perfection and power (as conatus). Now, reality relates to
everything that is as following from the nature of God as infinite, eternal, and perfect – so
reality is perfect. There is a sense (as stated in the quote) in which the power of God and
the power of man are the same, and this is because the power of man – his conatus – is a
determinate expression of the power of God. So as Spinoza explains, power of man and
power of God should not be understood as related because they are both infinite, on the
contrary, this would be impossible; rather, conatus as dynamic and organizing principle of
existence  operates  in  finitude  and  determination.  In  these  terms,  conatus  transforms
finitude and determination into the greatest advantage and virtue90 of human beings, since
89 Carriero 2011: 71.
90 E4d8: “By virtue and power I understand the same.”
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these  traits  are  that  through  which  they  can  form  relations  of  composition  and
consequently maximize their reality.
Above I have explained conatus as power and, more importantly, I have argued that,
even though it necessarily refers to the unique and determinate essence of modes, it also
has  a  fundamental  relational  connotation  to  it.  Admittedly,  sometimes  in  the  Ethics
Spinoza seems to use a language that can be understood as undermining such relational
aspect. For example, when defining adequate ideas and adequate causes he says that they
are adequate in themselves and when understood through themselves; and again, when
defining conatus, he explains it as being such in so far as a being is in itself. Nevertheless,
if  we  consider  this  language  in  the  context  of  Spinoza's  metaphysics  and  theory  of
knowledge,  we  understand  that  the  relational  aspect  of  both  substance/modes  and
mode/modes  is  never  undermined;  rather,  it  is  actually  constantly  reaffirmed  by  the
irreducible tension between unity and multiplicity.  Persevering in our own being, then,
means understanding our mode of existence as it relates to other modes, how these affect
us,  when  and  how  it  is  the  case  that  we  maximize  our  power  through  relations  of
composition  and,  conversely,  when  we  diminish  our  power  by  forming  relations  of
decomposition;  as  Deleuze  has  argued,  “The  order  of  causes  is  therefore  an  order  of
decomposition  and  composition  of  relations,  which  infinitely  affects  all  of  nature.”91 I
therefore disagree with Carrero, since we should be fussy about a differentiation between
power, reality, and perfection; while on the one hand, considering Spinoza's metaphysics
and in particular the notion of substance, the identity of reality and perfection is a given,
but on the other hand degrees of reality as perfection are not. Degrees of perfection are a
matter of power, and therefore of relations of composition and decomposition.
91 Deleuze 1988: 19.
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2.3  Knowledge in Experience: A Theory of Becoming
Spinoza's  theory of  knowledge as  differentiating adequate  and inadequate  ideas,
how we form them and how we act upon them, plays a central role in the  Ethics.  This
theory, however, is also informed by sense-experience, and this is especially true in the
case of modes – since we cannot know the essence of a mode from its definition. In the
Corollary of E2p1392 it is said that “Man consists of mind and body, and the human body
exists as we sense it.” Here Spinoza does not mean that we can have adequate knowledge
of the human body by means of  perception,  on the contrary,  he later  states that  “The
human mind does  not  know the  human body,  nor  does  it  know that  it  exists,  except
through the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected.”93 What Spinoza means is
that the only way in which we know that we have a body which is ours is by perceiving it
(in his terms, by having ideas of it being perceived).94 In general, in order to know modes
we need to experience them by means of affection, or, by means of relation – and it is by
means of these relations that we understand (through adequate or inadequate ideas) what
agrees with our  conatus,  what maximizes it,  and what hinders it.  Because of Spinoza's
mind/body parallelism, it would be plausible to hold that sense-perception plays a role as
fundamental as cognition, but the latter is admittedly discussed at more length throughout
the Ethics.95
It  is  true  that  conatus  is  the  essence  of  a  thing,  but  through  knowledge  and
experience  such  essence  is  constantly  informed  (in  the  form  of  composition  or
decomposition of power) by its relation to other essences, its context,  and its history.96
92 “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or, a certain actually existing mode of extension.”
93 E2p19.
94 Spinoza does mention adequate perception: in E2p39 he states that “There will be an adequate idea in the mind of 
that which is common to, and a property of, the human body and certain external bodies by which the human mind 
id often affected, and which is equally in the part and in the whole of any of these.” And then he continues in the 
Corollary: “From this it follows that the human body is the more capable of perceiving several things adequately, the
more things its body has in common with other bodies.”
95 Parkinson explains that the word 'perception' is used ambiguously here, since it is also used in reference to the mind:
“Spinoza sometimes distinguishes perception from conception, saying that the former indicates that the mind is 
passive, whereas the latter indicates that it is active. But he also says, when defining an attribute, that the intellect 
'perceives' certain things of substance; in this sense, 'perceive' seems to indicate any activity of the mind by which it 
'sees' something.” (Parkinson 2000: 323.) It is ironic here that Parkinson, in order to explain how the mind 
perceives, actually uses a sensory faculty.
96 “The human body can undergo many changes, and yet retain the impressions, i.e. the traces, of objects, and 
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According to Carriero “Spinoza is providing a theory of finite real beings.”97; I believe that
he  is  doing  something  more  precise  than  that.  As  I  previously  mentioned,  Spinoza
grounded his project on the fundamental and practical intuition that, as long as we exist,
we cannot not exist. Hence, I believe that Spinoza, through his theory of knowledge and his
theory of conatus – both based on his metaphysics – is providing a theory of becoming, in
order  to  provide  guidelines  on  the  ways  in  which  human beings  can  conduct  an  ever
flourishing existence.
Conclusion
Above I have argued that in his  Ethics, by building a metaphysics and developing a
theory of  knowledge based on a  core  relational  element  –  conatus –  Spinoza offers  a
theory of becoming. The concept of becoming is not articulated in the Ethics, nor has it
been theorized by Spinoza scholars. However, the advantage of this position is that it helps
us to make sense of both the tension between the One and the Many highlighted in his
metaphysics  and  the  dynamic  character  of  his  theory  of  knowledge.  Furthermore,
becoming  represents  the  missing  (perhaps  implied)  bridge  in  the  identity  of
reality/perfection and the degrees of reality/perfection of particular beings.
consequently the same images of things.” (E3post2.)
97 Carriero 2017: 152.
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Chapter 3
Becoming the One and the Many
Introduction
In the previous section I have argued that,  in the  Ethics, Spinoza is  providing a
theory of becoming. This reading can help us in making sense of the reason why, in order
to build an ethical system, Spinoza starts from a substance metaphysics. In this chapter I
suggest  that  this  theory  of  becoming  has  the  ultimate  purpose  of  providing  Spinoza's
famous “method, i.e. the way, which leads to freedom.”98 According to him, as previously
mentioned,  human beings  are  (as  everything else)  part  of  Nature  or  God –  Deus sive
Natura – therefore human existence needs to be understood in terms of laws of Nature,
which he describes in his metaphysics. It later becomes clear that, throughout the Ethics,
Spinoza's  main  concern  is  to  explain  in  what  way  can  we  have genuine  knowledge  of
Nature and of  our constitution as part of it. This knowledge, which informs our praxis as it
'perceives' the world, can lead us to the highest self-contentment, that is “pleasure which
has arisen from the fact that a man thinks of himself and of his power of acting.” 99 So
Spinoza's commitment throughout the Ethics is to provide a method for understanding the
dynamics of change leading from a lesser to a greater perfection, in order for human beings
to be masters of such change throughout their existence.
In the following chapter I further elaborate Spinoza's theory of becoming in two
ways: in the first section I explain becoming as learning, since the experience of particular
beings and the encounter of an essence with other essences represents a always on-going
discovery of an essence in the world. In the second section, I argue that it is becoming as
98 E5Preface.
99 E3DoE25.
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learning which constitutes the most important concern for Spinoza in his project, that is,
freedom – a topic to which he devotes the Fifth Part of the Ethics. I maintain that, in his
view, man is not born free, but rather he learns how to become so by learning to commit
his endeavour to the One as the Many.
3.1  Becoming as Learning
In the previous chapter we have seen how man, according to Spinoza, is in constant
transition from one state to another. This transition can lead, throughout the duration of
existence, to a lesser or a greater perfection. With his metaphysics, theory of knowledge,
and theory of conatus, Spinoza is providing us with an explanation of how change comes
about: in this context, understanding the dynamics of change in beings (the dynamics of
becoming)  is,  in fact,  a  matter  of  learning.  I  say  this  because transition,  or  becoming,
constantly implies possibilities of becoming, namely, range of ways in which becoming can
be actualized – and we do not know about those possibilities until we actually experience
them and we learn about them. This is why, according to Spinoza, to act in accordance with
our power (our virtue) “is simply to act, live, and preserve one's being (these three mean
the same)”100 As we have seen with adequate and inadequate ideas, in the case we are lead
towards  a  lesser  state  of  perfection  our  power  is  diminished  and  decomposed,  and
therefore it gets harder to act, live, and preserve our being. But even in this case, if we
understand how we are affected in the context of causal relations, the mind has the power
to turn passions (inadequate ideas) into actions (adequate ideas).
We  have  seen  that  in  the  Ethics emotions  play  a  fundamental  role:  they  mark
transitions from a state of perfection (of reality)  to  another.  We experience pain when
transitioning from a greater to a lesser state of perfection, in which our  conatus – our
100 E4p24.
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power of action – is hindered, and we experience pleasure when we move from a lesser to a
greater state of perfection, by forming relation with other essences that agree with our own
and therefore becoming more powerful. As previously mentioned, the fundamental way in
which we constantly maximize our power of action is by forming adequate ideas, which in
turn consists in understanding the causal relations of Nature and our place within those.
Indeed, emotions are an important part of these causal relations. In the preface to Part
Three,  Spinoza  attacks  the  common  understanding  of  emotions  as  being  “contrary  to
reason, empty, absurd, and horrible.”, by stating that:
Nothing happens in Nature which can be ascribed to a defect in it. For Nature is
always the same and everywhere is one, and its virtue and power of acting is the
same. That is, the laws of Nature and the rules in accordance with which all
things happen and are changed from one form into another are everywhere and
always the same; and therefore there must also be one and the same way of
understanding the nature of things of any kind – namely, by the universal laws
and  rules  of  Nature.  Therefore,  the  emotions  of  hatred,  anger,  envy,  etc.,
considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of Nature
as do all other particular things.101
So according to Spinoza, the way in which we can know about 'how things happen' and
how they change is to know the laws of Nature. With regard to emotions, it is important to
note that when Spinoza explains that, by having adequate understanding of our emotions
we “suffer less from them”102, he does not mean that we should suppress emotions or that
emotions  in  general  are  contrary  to  Nature.  What  he  means  is  that  by  understanding
emotions we can explain them by means of our essence, and therefore they do not hinder
our power of acting. The laws of Nature are, in fact, the laws of becoming. Within these
101 E3Preface.
102 E5p6.
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laws, the greatest power of man consists in forming adequate ideas, or, in understanding.
Spinoza recognizes that throughout our existence we always have both clear and confused
ideas; sometimes we act, sometimes we are acted upon, sometimes we are powerful and
sometimes we are not.103 Again, he recognizes that we are in constant transition, that we
are in becoming; so we always enter in relations with other beings, which can agree or not
agree with our essence, and so on and so forth. Now, we know from the previous chapter
that  emotions  are  affections,  i.e.  modifications,  of  the  body  (and  therefore,  by  the
parallelism  of  attributes,  also  of  the  mind);  depending  on  how  we  relate  to  those
modifications, we actualize certain possibilities of becoming.
In E5p4, Spinoza states that “There is no affection of the body of which we cannot
form some clear and distinct conception.” He also says, in the previous proposition, that
“An emotion which is a passion [confused, inadequate] ceases to be a passion as soon as
we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”104 So among the possibilities implied in becoming,
human beings have the  actual power of acquiring genuine understanding of everything
they experience. Again, according to Spinoza, understanding is the highest power of the
mind.105 It is important to note that, throughout the Ethics, understanding is not conceived
as merely intellectual activity detached from one's practice, since, as we have discussed, in
Spinoza  there  is  no  detachment  between  knowledge  and  praxis.  In  his  terms,
understanding is a practice which appears to have the same characteristics of the activity
of learning. This activity is a perpetual discovery of a given, the conatus, which takes place
by means of relation to other essences, and therefore in becoming. Let me explain. We
know from the previous chapter that the essence of man is to persevere in its being, and
this conatus not only is the common essence of all particular beings (not just man), but it
is also a determinate manifestation of the power of God. Indeed, as we have seen in E4p4d,
the  power  of  particular  beings  and  the  power  of  God  are  the  same  in  so  far  as  it  is
103 Both adequate and inadequate ideas necessarily follow from the nature of God. See E2p36.
104 E5p3.
105 E4p28d.
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explained by the essence of particular beings. In this sense, conatus (or 'power', or 'virtue')
seems  to  be  the  most  irreducible  common  notion,  since  all  beings  persevere  in  their
existence as long as they exist. On the other hand,  conatus  as dynamic and organizing
principle  is  also a  marker  of  difference,  since each mode is  a  determinate and unique
expression of substance, and the tendency of persevering in being and organizing power in
a  way  that  allows  modes  to  do  so  in  the  best  way  possible  also  depends  on  such
uniqueness.  Importantly,  it  is  in  experience  that  we  learn  about  such  uniqueness.  As
Spinoza states in an early letter, we need experience in the case of things which “cannot be
inferred from the definition of a thing, as, for example, the existence of modes.” 106 Again,
conatus  embodies  a  crucial  tension,  since  it  is  both  a  fundamental  common  notion
(everything exists as far as it can) but it is also a marker of difference at the same time
(each beings have specific terms of existing in the best way possible). In a way, conatus is a
given,  in  Spinoza's  words,  “No  virtue  can  be  conceived  as  prior  to  this-  namely,  the
endeavour to preserve oneself.”107 However, our understanding of it is not at all a given: we
learn about it by relating to other essences – other conatus – through which we experience
pain and pleasure, transitions through which it is possible to define the possibilities of our
becoming.  This  is  why  we  need  experience  in  the  case  of  modes,  because  in  their
definitions we are missing their uniqueness.
I say that  conatus  is a given because according to Spinoza “In Nature there exists
nothing contingent, but all things have been determined by necessity of the divine nature
to exist and operate in a certain way.”108 The real importance of understanding, then, lies in
recognizing  this  necessity,  and  therefore  in  having  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  causal
relations.  In  this  sense,  the  practice  of  understanding  seems  to  be  a  matter  constant
attunement between different conatus, in terms of both unity and difference. What I mean
by this is that each conatus has a character of both commonality (in terms of tendency)
106 As reported in Parkinson 2000: 33.
107 E4p22.
108 E1p29.
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and uniqueness (in terms of the terms of such tendency), and therefore the attunement of
different  conatus  in the constant process of forming relations always involve unity and
difference.  These  two  are  to  be  considered on two levels:  first,  there  is  the  unity  of  a
particular essence as unique and, at the same time, the commonality it shares with other
essences in existence; second, it is the unity of substance manifested in particular beings,
all of them unique and, at the same time, deriving from one source (God.) Becoming as
learning, it seems, has a circular character: the process of attunement, through which we
learn  to  understand  things  as  necessary,  involves  both  an  understanding  of  common
notions and an infinite discovery of the uniqueness of essences. This is why, according to
Spinoza, “The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God.”109
3.2  Learning Freedom
It is possible to argue that the first four parts of the Ethics are the structure in which
Spinoza, later in the Fifth Book, can finally discuss his dearest concern, namely, freedom. I
already  mentioned  that,  according  to  Spinoza,all  things  in  Nature  are  determined  by
necessity,  rather  than  contingency:  everything  follows  from  the  essence  of  the  one
substance, God or Nature. In E1d7, Spinoza states: “That thing is called free which exists
solely  by  the  necessity  of  its  own nature,  and  is  determined to  action  by  itself  alone.
However,  that  thing  is  called  necessary,  or  rather  compelled,  which  is  determined  by
another to exist and to operate in a  certain way.” For Spinoza, then, the only free being is
God, while everything which is in God is necessary, since the infinity of causal relations has
God as first cause. In other words, necessity is the modality of existence of everything that
is, and in this picture free will does not find a place. More than that, according to Spinoza,
free will  is an illusion resulting from a misunderstanding of the necessary character of
109 E5p24.
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reality; the belief in free will is actually privation of knowledge. In E2p35s it is said:
Men  are  deceived  in  that  they  think  themselves  as  free,  an  opinion which
consists simply in the fact that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant
of the causes by which those actions are determined. This, therefore, is their
idea of liberty: that they know no cause of their actions. For when they assert
that human actions depend on the will, these are just words, of which they have
no idea.
In  Spinoza's  view,  we  cannot  think  of  ourselves  as  determined  to  action  by  free  will
because we are determined to action by other causes in the infinity of causal relations. We
cannot be the absolute cause of our actions (since the only absolute cause – causa sui – is
God), but we can be the adequate of them in the moment we act according to the necessity
of  our  nature.  As  explained  by  Deleuze,  free  will  is  “A  fundamental  illusion  of
consciousness, to the extent that the latter is blind to causes, imagines possibilities and
contingencies, and believes in the willful action of the mind on the body.”110 How do we
reveal  such  illusion?  According  to  Spinoza,  we  do  so  by  understanding  the  necessary
nature of reality through both common notions and the specificity of our own nature at the
same time. We can do this by means of reason, which regards things “not as contingent,
but as necessary.”111 Reason is the type of knowledge through which we can understand
things as they are, without imposing arbitrary and misleading interpretations (opinions)
on the laws of Nature – to which opinions or arbitrary interpretations clearly do not apply.
It is important to note that it would be mistaken to think that, since according to Spinoza
nothing is contingent and everything is necessary, human beings have then no choice and,
in turn,  no responsibility  over their existence; our choice and responsibility  lies in our
110 Deleuze 1988: 70.
111 E2p44. “From this it follows that it depends solely on the imagination that we regard things, in respect of both the 
past and the future, as contingent.” (E2p44c1.)
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understanding.
Since everything is necessary, common notions (as much as  conatus) are a given;
they  are  generalities,  not  abstractions,  and  they  pertain  the  existing  modes  without
constituting  any  particular  essence  among  them.112 For  this,  common  notions,  in  my
opinion, are generalities in the sense that they are relations; in the same way any relations
implies a certain degree of reciprocity, so do common notions, with the difference that they
are relations among particular beings  as  expressions of the one substance. This is  why
Spinoza states that “The mind can bring it about that all affections of the body, i.e., the
images of things, are related to the idea of God.”113 Hence, we can understand – by means
of reason – that the necessary nature of reality is the same as the necessity implied in the
nature of God. Again, we learn how to do this in becoming, by means of practice, the same
practice  through which we learn to  form adequate  ideas.  Such practice,  again,  implies
perpetual discovery of each term of a relation, and the emotions have a leading role in
guiding the movement of reciprocity implied in each being's existence. With regard to this,
Deleuze has offered important insights:
For when we encounter a body that agrees with ours, we experience an affect or
feeling of joy-passion, although we do not yet adequately know what it has in
common with us. Sadness, which arises from our encounter with a body that
does not agree with ours, never induces us to form a common notions; but joy
passion, as an increase of the power of acting and of comprehending, does bring
this about: it is an occasional cause of the common notion. This is why Reason is
defined in two ways, which show that man is not born rational but also how he
becomes rational. Reason is: 1. an effort to select and organize good encounters,
that is, encounters of modes that enter into composition with ours and inspire
us with joyful passion (feelings that  agree with reason); 2. the perception and
112 By E2p37.
113 E5p44.
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comprehension of the common notions, that is, of the relations that enter into
this composition, from which one deduces other relations (reasoning) and on
the basis of which one experiences new feelings, active ones this time (feelings
that are born of reason).114
It seems to me that in learning the practice of understanding there are two moments: one
that concerns apprehension of what agrees with our nature, and one that organize – in a
sense, create – what agrees with our nature. Both moments imply a perpetual discovery of
the One and the Many as the One and the Many. This type of discovery, in Spinoza's terms,
leads  to  a  perpetual  transition  to  a  greater  perfection  in  accordance  with  one's  own
conatus; in other words, when a person's becoming is understood and actualized through
the laws of Nature, then she becomes (and keeps on becoming) a free human being. This is
why Spinoza states that “The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the
highest virtue of the mind is to know God.”115
For Spinoza, then, man is not born free: he becomes free, or, more precisely, he
learns throughout his existence what freedom is. The latter lies in what I have previously
called  'practice  of  attunement'  between  the  One  and  the  Many  on  two  levels:  1)  the
attunement between one's unique essence with other unique essences, which leads to the
perpetual  actualization  of  one's  becoming  in  plentitude;  2)  the  attunement,  through
common  notions,  between  the  unity  and  diversity  of  modes,  which  leads  to  a  clear
understanding  of  the  one  substance  as  the  necessary  source  of  everything  that  is
necessarily. Learning freedom, then, is about committing our endeavour to the One as the
Many and also to the Many as the One at the same time, or, to conceive our becoming as a
perpetual becoming the One and the Many:
If the way that I have shown to lead to this seems to be very arduous, yet it can
114 Deleuze 1988: 55-56.
115 E4p28.
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be discovered. And indeed it must be arduous, since it is found so rarely. For
how could it happen that, if salvation were ready at hand and could be found
without great labour, it is neglected by almost all? But all excellent things are as
difficult as they are rare.116
Conclusion
Considering the above, we could say that freedom in Spinoza is learning, in the sense
of a process which involves the constant discovery of both uniqueness of particular beings
and  their  commonalities;  freedom  is  actualized  within  the  spectrum  of  becoming.
Admittedly, considering Spinoza's metaphysics – and, in particular, the prominent role of
causal  relations  –  the  problem  seems  to  be  that  freedom lies  in  knowing  there  is  no
freedom, since what is cannot possibly otherwise. This reading undeniably finds support in
the text of the Ethics, and represents the most concise summary of Spinoza's critique of the
notion of free will. However, I think that there is more to Spinoza's view: he is concerned
with establishing guidelines for human flourishing, and therefore he needs to take into
account some basic  principles  which cannot  be  overlooked in  developing such project,
namely,  the  fact  that  human  beings  are  finite,  uniquely  determined,  and  always
contextualized in networks of reciprocal relations. In this context, free will could only take
place in a vacuum in which we are taken away from both the human context and human
constitution.  Spinoza  is  a  practical  philosopher  because he  recognizes  that  the  highest
power of man is understanding his constitution in the world, in order to master becoming
through practice in experience; ultimately such mastery itself is a kind of becoming.
116 E5p42s.
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Conclusion
I stated several times throughout this work that the Ethics is a project aimed at
providing guidelines for human flourishing. The latter necessarily takes place in the
world and through our experience of it  and interactions with it,  and this is why
Spinoza  starts  his  work by elaborating a  metaphysics;  he  wants  to  identify  and
make  sense  of  these  dynamics  so  that  they  can  be  understood.  Everything,
according  to  Spinoza,  happens  within  the  laws  of  Nature  (God,  or  the  one
substance) and nothing can be considered apart from these – not perfection, not
emotions,  not  freedom.  It  is  true  that  the  theme  of  becoming  is  not  explicitly
addressed in the  Ethics,  and perhaps as a consequence of  this no scholars have
considered it as present in Spinoza's work. In my opinion, however, the fact that the
theme is not explicitly addressed is not enough to not plausibly consider it as part of
Spinoza's  project.  Furthermore,  considering the practical  character of  the  latter,
and  considering  what  discussed  in  the  Ethics,  it  would  indeed  seem  absurd  if
Spinoza overlooked that which appears to be the most undeniable and irreducible
aspect of reality. I have attempted to show that becoming plays a fundamental role
in  Spinoza's  project:  by  elaborating  a  metaphysics,  he  sets  its  foundation  and
dynamics; by explaining his theory of knowledge, he clarifies how these dynamics
practically  affect  our  development  and  power  of  action;  and  by  his  theory  of
conatus Spinoza shows how the coherence of these dynamics and the uniqueness of
particular beings necessarily coexist. The knowledge – informing our  praxis –  of
such  coexistence  constitutes  what  in  the  Ethics  is  considered  as  the  highest
principle of human flourishing: freedom. We can therefore understand how Spinoza
could identify reality as perfection: it is only through the perpetual coexistence of
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the One and the Many that harmony can exist. If there was only unity there would
we could not make sense of difference, while if there was only difference we could
not have experience of the world, nor of ourselves. It is only within the tension of
unity and diversity that harmony takes place. In trying to establish the guidelines of
human  flourishing,  it  seems  to  me  that  Spinoza  acknowledged  our  undeniable
finitude as uniqueness, but also that the latter depends on other finitudes for both
its  constitution  and  our  knowledge  of  it.  It  is  through  the  infinite  relation  of
finitudes that everything becomes, and it is only through the experience of finitude
that we learn unity. I think this is precisely what, according to Spinoza, freedom is:
a perpetual discovery of the One as the Many.
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